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INTRODUCTION 
 
Not many topics have sparked as much discussion among international relations scholars as 
the state of transatlantic relationship in recent years. Countless volumes cautioning about the 
Alliance at Risk and Partners at Odds, and others debating The End of the West? or whether 
Europe and America are Growing Apart? does not seem to bode well for the future of the 
transatlantic alliance. The question on most observers‟ mind is whether we are witnessing 
mere transatlantic rifts that can be mended by closer cooperation and more tactful diplomacy, 
or whether we are seeing a wider drift apart that cannot be stopped easily, if at all. Most of the 
scholarly literature draws attention to the fact that the causes for recent transatlantic tensions 
lie deeper than the war in Iraq and President Bush‟s foreign policy. They cite the end of the 
Cold War and differing interests on both sides of the Atlantic most commonly as a reason for 
the current state of transatlantic affairs. 
The most notable work on transatlantic differences since 9/11 comes from Robert Kagan. He 
writes that “it is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view 
of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.”1 His explanation for this occurrence 
is twofold. Firstly, the transatlantic power gap is responsible for divergent views. Europe – 
compared to the US – is weak, therefore viewing the world differently and these different 
points of view, weak versus strong, have produced differing strategic judgments and 
assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing them. Secondly, Kagan argues, 
ideological divergences have also emerged between Europe and the United States. Because of 
its unique historical experience over the past 50 years, Europe has developed a set of ideals 
                                                     
1
 Kagan, Paradise & Power, (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 3 
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and principles with regard to the utility and morality of power different from those of the 
Americans, who have not shared this experience.
2
 
A more positive view comes from Timothy Garton Ash, who contends in his book Free 
World that American and European values and interests are not to blame for transatlantic 
tensions, since they have not diverged that much. Views within America and within Europe 
might differ because of the great diversity of both the US and Europe, but the European 
democracies remain closer US allies than the people of any other region are, or are likely to 
become anytime soon. Their tactics might differ but Americans and Europeans broadly share 
the same democratic, liberal values for their societies and for the rest of the world.
3
 
Realists, unconcerned with ideology, share the view that Europe and America still share 
common strategic goals. However, as Stephen Walt argues, it was the end of the Cold War 
and with it the disappearance of the common communist threat that brought about 
transatlantic tensions. During the Cold War, Europe had no other choice but to fall in line 
with the Americans who secured Europe‟s security.4 But this has changed in the post-Cold 
War world and Europe has become more independent.  
Some, like John McCormick, are hailing The European Superpower, which – according to 
Mark Leonard – will run the 21st century. Because globalization and interdependence have 
undermined old-style power politics and replaced it with a more complex set of international 
relationships, their argument goes, the EU has become a new breed of superpower, which is 
more effective by relying on cooperation than the American way of coercion.
5
 But these 
different approaches do not necessarily come with more transatlantic agreement.  
                                                     
2
 Ibid., pp. 10-1 
3
 Garton Ash, Free World (New York: Random House, 2004) 
4
 Walt, “The Ties That Fray,” The National Interest 54 (Winter 1998), p. 6-7 
5
 McCormick, The European Superpower (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 2 
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Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Mark Hertsgaard have given still another reason for transatlantic 
disputes since the end of the Cold War. They warn of the danger of American unilateralism, 
which Nye labels the „arrogance of power.‟6 In reference to US-European relations in 
particular, he points out that the US has been more inconsiderate towards multilateral 
institutions since the end of the Cold War. Consequently, the US has gained the reputation for 
not paying enough attention to its allies‟ concerns, thus causing resentment in Europe.7 This 
resentment has been reinforced by President George W. Bush entering the stage and 
representing this American “arrogance of power” with his rhetoric.  
There are many reasons for tensions in US-EU relations and while the past fifty years were 
anything but a period of transatlantic bliss, the crisis over the 2003 invasion of Iraq has 
eclipsed previous American-European conflicts in magnitude and within the scholarly 
literature. Of course, there have been conflicts before, like the American opposition to the 
seizure of the Suez Canal by French, British, and Israeli troops in 1956; France‟s withdrawal 
from NATO‟s integrated military command in the 1960s; the battle over Euro Missiles in the 
early 1980s; and the clash over how to stop war in the Balkans in the 1990s.
8
 The 1993-5 
crisis over the war in Bosnia, in particular, is often mentioned in passing as an example of 
transatlantic quarrels. Detailed examinations resembling the scope of the Iraq War coverage in 
terms of transatlantic differences, however, are rare.  
Curiously, most of the mentioned works on transatlantic tensions make reference to the 
Bosnia crisis, but mostly as a brief example of how it supports their thesis. For example, Ash 
is drawing attention to the fact that it was the Europeans who pushed for ground troops in the 
Balkans at a time when the martial Americans “were still bombing from 15,000 feet in case 
                                                     
6
 Hertsgaard, The Eagle’s Shadow (London: Bloomsbury, 2002) and Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American 
Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
7
 Nye, “US and Europe: Continental Drift?” International Affairs 76, January-February 2000, p. 51-9 
8
 Asmus, “Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs 82 (September-October 2003), p. 21 
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one of their warrior pilots got his little finger burnt.”9 But Kagan, too, uses the Bosnia 
intervention to make his point that Europeans were too weak to even handle their backyard 
problems.
10
 
Detailed studies on Bosnia in regards to US-European relations like Friendly Fire by 
Elizabeth Pond on Iraq are hard to find, but the academic literature on the Balkan crisis is 
vast. Many works refer to the aspects of humanitarian intervention in regards to the conflict, 
like Empire Lite by Michael Ignatieff and Robert DiPrizio‟s Armed Humanitarians. Some 
accounts draw attention to the diplomatic aspects of the crisis like James Gow‟s Triumph of 
the Lack of Will, others focus on US policy towards the Balkans like Getting to Dayton by Ivo 
Daalder and Wayne Bert‟s The Reluctant Superpower. 
Bosnia had become a concern for the international community after the collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War, when the wars of dissolution 
began in Yugoslavia. This led to several regional disputes, one of them affecting Bosnia 
where the situation turned into armed ethnic conflicts. The Europeans took action in order to 
preserve the balance of power and geographical stability, and to avoid a regional war that 
could develop into a global conflict, as had happened in 1914.
11
 
The US let the Europeans handle the Bosnia problem at first. Due to the humanitarian 
dimension of the conflict they entered the scene by pushing Europe to recognize Bosnian 
independence. But this did not have the hoped for effect and according to James Gow, Bosnia 
soon became a constant source of friction between the international organizations involved, 
especially the European Community and the UN.
12
 These frictions also affected NATO and 
threatened its credibility.
13
 The US was not ready to let NATO dissolve and entered the 
                                                     
9
 Garton Ash, “The Great Divide,” Prospect (February 20, 2003) 
10
 Kagan, p. 42-3 
11
 Garton Ash (2004), p. 96 
12
 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 67 
13
 Daalder, Getting to Dayton (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 2 
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conflict in support of the Atlantic Alliance. Still, US-European tensions developed, and 
persisted even until after the Dayton Accords were signed to end the Bosnian War.  
This paper will examine the reasons for US-EU tensions for both cases in detail. In the first 
chapter, the alteration of the strategic landscape brought about by the end of the Cold War 
will be examined. Furthermore, it will be looked at the impact of the September 11 terror 
attacks on transatlantic relations as well as the implications of the European project.  
Henry Kissinger famously asked whom to call if he wanted to speak to Europe. Until Europe 
has a phone number and at the other end someone to speak on the EU's behalf, it will be 
difficult to speak about European involvement in any crisis without addressing the policies of 
its member states. According to Ash, “Europe‟s true hallmark is not weakness but 
diversity.”14 Despite the successes of European integration, this diversity is still reflected 
quite obviously in its member states‟ divided foreign policies in many areas. This is not to say 
that the US is not diverse, but there was one US policy on Bosnia and one US policy on Iraq. 
In Europe there were many. Of course, an exhaustive examination of all of them would go 
beyond the scope of this paper, even though the focus of transatlantic tensions limits the 
affected states somewhat. Nevertheless, France, Germany and Great Britain as the key players 
in Europe will be the main focus of the following analysis. The wider issue of European 
public opinion, which seems to be more united in its opposition to the US lately, deserves 
consideration in this context as well. However, this issue and the resulting difficulty for 
adopting a coherent approach to Europe, will be addressed in the second chapter. 
This chapter will also explore several other explanations for the tensions, mostly put forward 
by Kagan. It will be looked at the importance of power and weakness, as well as the impact of 
differing worldviews on US-EU relations. Chapter 3 will provide an in depth look at the 
Bosnia and Iraq crises in terms of diplomatic failures, personal differences and the „arrogance 
                                                     
14
 Garton Ash (2003) 
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of power.‟ By drawing comparisons between both crises throughout the paper, it will be 
established that a combination of the factors was causing disputes in both cases. Evidence for 
changed geopolitical realities as well as diverging values and differing worldviews based on 
different power capabilities, as Kagan has argued, can be seen in the reasons for the Bosnia as 
well as the Iraq crisis. At the same time, tensions can be attributed to one-time factors of 
different circumstances, such as domestic politics and diplomatic gaffes. The comparison also 
shows that European nostalgia for the Clinton administration is in many aspects misplaced, in 
particular in regard to unilateral action.  
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CHAPTER 1 
“The political “West” is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one.”15 
 
 
When Owen Harries made this observation in 1993, he was witnessing transatlantic disputes 
as a result of the Bosnian War. “It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 
“East,” he wrote, “to bring [the West] into existence and to maintain its unity.”16 Whether the 
Alliance could survive the disappearance of that enemy, Harries found doubtful, and was 
supported by turbulent post-1991 times in transatlantic relations. As soon as the Soviet enemy 
had crumbled, the transatlantic gloves came off, it seemed.  
 
Beginning in the fall of 2002, his thesis was again confirmed; this time by an even bigger 
transatlantic dispute over the US led intervention in Iraq. Whereas many different factors 
contributed to the transatlantic crises over Bosnia and Iraq, geopolitical changes go a long 
way in explaining why the US and Europe clashed in these instances. This chapter will 
examine how the end of the Cold War and its implications has changed transatlantic relations, 
and – unfortunately, not for the better.  
 
Western policy on Bosnia, at least initially, has often been described as a failure.
17
 The West 
stood by while innocent people were raped, slaughtered and expelled from their homes in a 
self-described Serb campaign of “ethnic cleansing,” in terms of brutality and number of 
casualties last seen in Europe during the Second World War.
18
 European leaders seemed 
determined to find a solution for the problem by themselves, prompting European 
                                                     
15
 Harries, “The Collapse of „The West,‟” Foreign Affairs 72, 4 (September/October 1993), p. 42 
16
 Ibid., p. 42 
17
 Daalder (2000), pp. 1-2. 
18
 Ibid., p. 5 
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Commission President Jacques Delors to say, “We do not interfere in American affairs. We 
hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours.”19 And German foreign minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher asserted that for every European problem there is a European 
solution.
20
 
 
Bosnia thus marked the first serious attempt at European independence from its Cold War 
patron. The crisis has shown that in the absence of a common enemy, Europe and the United 
States still share common goals, but the extent of their urgency and seriousness is not the 
same on both sides of the Atlantic. This has led to the fact that conflicts of interest are 
becoming more visible and significant. The US does no longer automatically receive the 
respect that it enjoyed as the protector in the fight against a common, mortal enemy.
21
 Both 
Europe and the US now have a wider selection of options. As Stephen Walt argues, “the rigid 
logic of bipolarity limited choices on both sides of the Iron Curtain, which meant there was 
little debate about the fundamentals of Western grand strategy.”22 
  
The Americans for their part were turning more inward after they had with Bill Clinton 
elected a president who was going to focus “like a laser” on the economy and remove foreign 
policy from his list of priorities. According to Wayne Bert “the US found itself without a clear 
mission for its armed forces, and with a realization that the military would see few crises 
jeopardizing its vital interests and requiring a quick response that would automatically be 
supported by the public.”23 Clinton thus continued his predecessor‟s policy on Bosnia, who 
                                                     
19
 Mowle, Allies At Odds? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), p. 118 
20
 Quoted in “Ugly Nationalism” in The Economist 320, 7726 (September 28, 1991), p. 20 
21
 Mathews, “Estranged Partners,” Foreign Policy, 127 (November-December 2001), p. 51; Walt (1998), p. 4 
22
 Walt (1998), p. 5.  
23
 Wayne Bert, p. 7 
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had let the Europeans take charge in the Balkans after recent US engagement in the Gulf War, 
and in May 1993, affirmed to Atlantic allies that Bosnia was a “European issue.”24  
When it became clear that the Europeans were incapable of putting an end to the suffering in 
the former Yugoslavia, however, transatlantic problems started to take on a serious dimension 
and soon turned into public feuding. Europe was calling for American help, but the 
Americans were not willing to provide the help in the way the Europeans had hoped. This in 
turn led to finger-pointing in NATO and bickering over who is to blame, while each threat of 
military intervention went unmet.
25
 
The European-led Western response in the early stages of the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia had been to condemn Serb actions and impose a total economic embargo on 
Serbia and Montenegro to force an end to their involvement in the Bosnian War. In addition 
to that, European troops were sent as part of a UN peacekeeping force to protect humanitarian 
relief supplies for affected communities. But the results were mixed at best. The embargo was 
devastating the economies of Serbia and Montenegro but not Belgrade‟s support for Bosnian 
and Croatian Serbs. The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) protected relief efforts and 
prevented an even worse humanitarian disaster.
26
  
 
In September the UN passed a resolution to allow the use of NATO airpower to support 
UNPROFOR protection of aid shipments and the following month a no-fly zone was imposed 
over Bosnia. However, NATO took no action until February. Only when the Serbs attacked a 
marketplace in Sarajevo on 5 February, did NATO issue an ultimatum to the Serbs to move 
their weapons 20 km outside of Sarajevo. The Serbs complied but responded by attacking the 
                                                     
24
 Bill Clinton quoted in Paul F. Horvitz, “Intervention in Bosnia: Clinton Mutes His Fervor” in International 
Herald Tribune, May 13, 1993.  
25
 Cohen, “Finger-Pointing by NATO Allies Delays Help for a Bosnian Town” in New York Times, January 22, 
1994 
26
 Daalder (2000), p. 5 
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safe haven of Gorazde and taking 200 UN peacekeepers as hostages, deterring the UN from 
authorizing further air strikes for several months. More hostages were taken in November 
1994 and peace plans continued to be rejected, leading to rising frustration in European 
capitals.
27
 But not until August 1995, did the US finally decide to take matters firmly into its 
own hands, when it became clear that “the risks of taking the lead were nonetheless less than 
the risks posed by any alternative course.”28 
 
After the successful US initiative, the Dayton Accords were signed in December 1995 and for 
a few years the Bosnia situation calmed down before NATO decided to attack Yugoslavia in a 
successful bombing campaign in order to stop Serb aggression under Milosevic. 
 
Then came the September 11 terrorist attacks and Harries' prediction seemed to have been 
correct again: “The concept of “the West” is likely to revert to what it has been for most of the 
past: a concept of last resort, held in reserve for when things go seriously bad and individual 
countries or restricted alliances are unable to cope on their own.”29 The US intervention in 
Afghanistan gained unconditional support from European leaders and NATO invoked Article 
5 for the first time in its history. Transatlantic peace after 9/11 did not last for long, though. 
After all, the major difference was that while Europe had needed the US security umbrella to 
protect it from communism and US commitment to deal with Bosnia, the US was not 
dependent on the Europeans to take out Saddam Hussein for his ties to terrorists and his desire 
for weapons of mass destruction.  
 
At the same time, the disappearance of a common enemy had come with a certain loss of 
credibility for the United States. As long as the Communist threat loomed, the US had an 
                                                     
27
 Mowle, p. 119 
28
 Daalder (2000), p. 163 
29
 Harries, p. 53 
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obvious interest in keeping Europe independent of Soviet control.
30
 The US was on a mission 
that was accepted by its European allies. With the Cold War over and the mission gone, 
however, Europeans think twice before they accept or support any military action the US 
takes, as French and German divergence over Iraq has shown. Germany and France strongly 
opposed the US decision to go to war in Iraq due to a variety of reasons but mostly because 
the US seemed to be bound to act, with or without French or German support.
31
 Transatlantic 
name-calling ensued, potato dishes were renamed, and diplomatic gaffes on both sides did 
nothing to relieve the icy climate between America and Old Europe until long after Bush had 
landed on the aircraft carrier and declared the mission in Iraq as accomplished.   
 
The post-Cold War era had changed European and American political priorities and 9/11 
reinforced this trend. While it was the US that focused on domestic issues during the early 
1990s, it was the Europeans that were turning more and more inward by 2002. The EU has 
become the focal point of European policy and activity over a vast range of areas, from trade 
and monetary to social policy.
32
 EU enlargement is also a very ambitious project, one that will 
come with continued costs and consequences, not just for the EU itself but also for the future 
of Atlanticism. David Long defines Atlanticism as an Atlantic identity that existed before 
NATO became a pragmatic response to threat or a useful device. Long writes “Maintaining 
transatlantic solidarity, a difficult business in any event, is made all the harder because it is 
being undercut by another transnational collective identity project, the EU.”33 Widening and 
deepening of the EU is undermining Atlanticism because the increase in the size of the EU 
and its greater coherence and cohesion, resulting from the growing importance of the EU as 
the hub of regional cooperation in Europe, is the basis of a stronger sense of identity as well 
                                                     
30
 Walt (1998), p. 5. 
31
 Merkl, The Distracted Eagle (New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 6 
32
 Daalder “The End of Atlanticism,” Survival 45  (Summer 2003), p. 163 
33
 David Long, “NATO after Atlanticsim” in Osvaldo Croci and Amy Verdun (eds.) The Transatlantic Divide 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 27  
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as a tendency for the policy of its member states to oppose the US rather than each other.
34
 
The severity of the crisis within the EU that followed disagreements on whether to support US 
military action in Iraq, in particular with regard to the new Eastern European member states, 
seems to support this outlook.  
 
While Europe is chiefly concerned with EU integration and expansion, the US has a more 
global outlook since 9/11. Since the attacks, Washington is concentrating on defeating 
terrorists, rogue states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
35
 Having come 
eye to eye with their own vulnerability, Americans realized that the “survival of liberty in our 
land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.”36 And as Donald Rumsfeld 
explained:  
we acted [in Iraq] because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the 
prism of our experience on 9/11… that experience changed our appreciation of our 
vulnerability and the risks the US faces from terrorist states and terrorist networks 
armed with weapons of mass murder.
37
  
 
Clearly, the US and Europe no longer focus on transatlantic relations to the degree they did 
during the Cold War. Instead, one is focusing globally now, and the other locally. While this 
role was somewhat reversed in the early 1990s, it was still becoming clear that the end of the 
bipolar international system and shifting priorities were working against continued strong 
transatlantic ties. Whether this means that Harries is right with his prediction that the West 
will see further clashes in the absence of a common enemy because it was born out of fear and 
danger instead of common values remains to be seen. He points out, however, that everyone 
who argues for the importance of common values for Western unity should consider the fact 
that while common features had existed long before the Cold War, “they had never created or 
                                                     
34
 Long, p. 30-33 
35
 Daalder (2003), p. 162; Nye (2000), p. 55 
36
 George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (January 20, 2005) 
37
 Rumsfeld, “Prepared Testimony,” Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington (July 9, 2003) 
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sustained a united West before the appearance of a shared and formidable enemy.”38 Many 
observers have taken a similar view on common values and pointed to a transatlantic gap in 
this regard as reason for US-EU disputes. This argument will be looked at closer in the next 
chapter, where will be examined why Europe and America have drawn different conclusions 
from the changes in the geopolitical environment and how those can be related to rifts over 
Bosnia and Iraq.  
                                                     
38
 Harries, p. 47 
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CHAPTER 2 
“Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”39 
 
Robert Kagan clearly thinks that the powerful Americans and the weak Europeans share little 
common ground.
40
 Although his characterization is somewhat of a caricature, Kagan is right 
in that Europeans and Americans do perceive the world differently in many respects. This 
chapter will examine to what extent these differing worldviews, resulting from a military 
power gap and ideological differences, have caused transatlantic tensions over Bosnia and 
Iraq.  
According to Kagan‟s power gap thesis, capabilities determine action. The US is using 
military force because it can. Europeans are weak and therefore oppose military action: 
“When you don‟t have a hammer, you don‟t want anything to look like a nail.”41 Of course, a 
military power gap between the US and its European allies cannot be denied. The end of the 
Cold War also came with the emergence of the US as the only superpower, unrivalled in its 
military capacity by anyone. 
That different outlooks on the use of military power create problems for the alliance is 
plausible. However, the power gap between the US and Europe has always been a part of the 
transatlantic relationship. During the Cold War it was precisely American power that 
protected Western Europe from communism. Europeans do not necessarily have an aversion 
to power or the use of it. In the words of Gordon and Shapiro, “While the Americans limited 
themselves to bombing, the British, French and Dutch deployed a Rapid Reaction Force on 
                                                     
39
 Kagan, p. 3 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid., pp. 27-8 
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the ground.”42 Great Britain, Spain, Italy, Poland and a number of other European countries 
joined the US intervention in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein. Even the French and Germans 
promised “unlimited solidarity” for an attack on Afghanistan and sent troops to support the 
US. Nor does US “hyperpuissance” make Americans always rely on force more than they 
should, as US policy on Bosnia has shown.  
The war in Bosnia has clearly demonstrated European weakness. But it also reveals that 
Kagan‟s argument about the psychology of power and weakness is not as straightforward as 
he makes it out to be. When European inability to deal with the problem in Bosnia became 
clear, they called for American involvement. But what did their Martian allies do? They tried 
to avoid ground troops at all cost: “At the core of its failure to adequately address the Bosnian 
crisis was a collective will on the part of Western leaders, especially America, to make the 
hard choice to intervene with force.”43  
The conflict was ended when the Clinton administration finally was determined to use force, 
leading Wayne Bert to conclude that the interesting question “is not what US capabilities are, 
but rather what role it wants to play in international politics.”44 But Bosnia came at a time 
when the US was lacking determination in terms of its goals on the international stage. 
Clinton‟s secretary of defense, William Perry later acknowledged that “we should have been 
prepared to use or to threaten to use military force from the beginning.”45 And Richard 
Holbrooke observed after Dayton that “even those who chafed at the reassertion of American 
power conceded, at least implicitly, its necessity.”46 
Evidently, the use of force is often contended in US-EU relations, but not necessarily because 
the US is acting militarily and Europe is against it. One of the reasons why the Europeans, 
                                                     
42
 Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 190 
43
 DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), p. 103 
44
 Bert, p. 9 
45
 Quoted in Sciolino, “Bosnia Policy Shaped by US Military Role” in New York Times (July 29, 1996) 
46
 Holbrooke, To End A War (New York: Modern Library, 1999), p. 351 
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especially the French, were unhappy with how the US handled things during the Bosnia crisis 
was because they were pressing for a more aggressive policy against the Serbs, while the US 
was not prepared to change the status quo of the Bosnia intervention. According to General 
John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Clinton, the people 
in charge thought that “we could somehow let them be on the ground and we would be in the 
air and that would be enough, but there is a very important lesson that you cannot be in an 
alliance with nations and somehow step back from a leadership position."
47
 
In many ways it was the French that finally pushed Washington into action. They took a more 
aggressive approach in 1995 under the lead of newly elected president Jacques Chirac. He 
was concerned with French credibility as a Great Power as well as the credibility of NATO 
and thus viewed US passivity on the Bosnia issue with resentment.
48
 After his return home 
from talks in Washington in June 1995 derisively announced that the position of the leader of 
the free world was “vacant.”49 In July, he unleashed more criticism of the allied performance 
in Bosnia, clearly directed at the United States, saying that some countries were behaving 
irresponsibly, “preaching democracy and human rights but being increasingly unwilling to put 
out money or soldiers to defend them.”50 Eight years later, over the Iraq issue, Chirac was 
again not happy with the US, but this time because they were prepared to put soldiers on the 
ground for democracy and human rights. Of course, there were other issues at play in the 
French reaction to the Iraq invasion, but it can be concluded that it is not American use of 
force by itself that creates tensions within the alliance, since the lack of it also caused rifts. 
Looking closer at the Bosnia crisis, it also becomes clear that the Americans are not the only 
ones driven by traditional power considerations, trying to navigate the anarchic Hobbesian 
                                                     
47
 Quoted in Sciolino (1996) 
48
 Lucarelli, Europe and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (Hague, London: Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp.  170-
8 
49
 Sciolino (1996) 
50
 Mitchell, “US Weighs a Response to French Call on Bosnia” in New York Times (July 15, 1995) 
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world. Of course, the fact that Europeans were calling for US help to bail them out, is proof 
positive for Kagan‟s thesis that the US helped to create a Kantian world of “perpetual peace” 
in Europe, by taking care of their security and letting Europeans focus on their economic 
prosperity.
51
 But his contention that Europe is not ambitious for power anymore rings hollow 
when examining the European policy rationales in Bosnia.
52
  
When the crisis emerged in Yugoslavia, it was President Bush‟s secretary of state James 
Baker who dismissed US intervention in Bosnia with the realist observation that the US has 
“no dog in that fight.” The US did not have a national interest at stake in Bosnia. But neither 
did the Europeans, who treated the troubles in Yugoslavia initially largely according to 
Bismarck‟s belief that the “Balkans are not worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier.”53 
It might have been military weakness that led Europeans to arrive at the consensus to “risk the 
least” in Bosnia.54 But it also shows that European actions based on realist calculations are not 
a thing of the pre-World War II era. The EU, as Robert Jervis points out with reference to the 
more recent Iraq crisis, responds to its most powerful members after all: 
[t]he dominance [East European] nations fear most is not American but Franco-
German. The United States is more powerful, but France and Germany are closer and 
more likely to overshadow them. Indeed, French and German resentment toward such 
nations is no more surprising than Washington‟s dismissal of Old Europe. The irony is 
that even while France and Germany bitterly decried US efforts to hustle them into 
line, these two nations disparaged and bullied the East European states that sided with 
Bush – not exactly Venus-like behavior.55  
Similarly, the Balkans might not have posed a direct threat to the Europeans, but they did see 
strategic interests at stake. Sonia Lucarelli, for example, observes that France exerted the 
greatest constant pressure for something to be done in ex-Yugoslavia because it was trying to 
create an “effective European pillar within the Alliance with France on top” and because it 
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was worried about German hegemony in a fragmented Yugoslavia.
56
 Germany for its part 
was, according to foreign minister Klaus Kinkel, not prepared to “break with the European 
position,” after it had unilaterally recognized Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 and had earned 
great criticism for this decision, some even saying that it had made war inevitable.
57
 After this 
disaster, its national interest dictated Germany to go with everyone else on the issue. All the 
while, Britain had ruled out using an expeditionary force to protect Bosnia unless there was 
substantial input of US ground troops.
58
  
If anything, therefore, the Bosnia crisis has shown in what disarray Europe is in terms of 
foreign policy cohesion. Despite their attestations that the European countries were not 
divided on the issue of Bosnia, policy makers in Britain, France and other European countries 
were struggling to coordinate their response.
59
 They agreed on the need for more troops and 
equipment, as well as the need for a mobile rapid intervention force to avoid similar crises in 
the future. But the French and British seemed to have different visions of what that force 
should be. In June 1995, Britain announced the increase of its troops by at least 1,000 and 
potentially more, but France “seemed to have something grander in mind: a large force, 
between 4,000 and 5,000 men, stationed in a central location, highly mobile and heavily 
armed.”60 This was not the only instance of European disagreements over and, by extension, 
failure on the Bosnia issue. How was it possible that Europe did nothing? The answer, 
Jonathan Eyal says, is rather simple: „Europe‟ as such did not exist.61 
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In the same way, nearly a decade later, the furor over Europe‟s divisions hid an unstated 
assumption that Europe should be united on an issue like Iraq.
62
 However, in terms of 
European foreign policy coherence nothing much had changed, leading Ash to conclude that 
Kagan is actually too kind to Europe, “in the sense that he elevated to a deliberate, coherent 
approach what is, in fact, a story of muddled seeking and national differences.”63   
When Kagan speaks of pacifist Europeans, he seems to describe first and foremost the 
Germans, “who seem to live in a postwar, postconflict geopolitical fantasyland, where the 
greatest threat to existence, it seems, is the mixing of green glass with brown.”64 Considering 
Germany‟s historical baggage, it is neither a bad thing nor necessarily surprising that the 
Germans have dedicated themselves to fighting holes in the ozone layer. But then there are 
the Britons, traditionally a warrior nation, with their imperial history.
65
 Should this 
background not make them more like the trigger-happy Americans? The actions in Iraq under 
Tony Blair certainly look that way. Even John Major concluded in regard to Bosnia that “Our 
instincts and outlook were more often in tune with North America than with Western 
Europe.”66 And yet, all across Europe, people demonstrated against an invasion of Iraq, even 
in countries that militarily supported the US. By simply looking at the Bosnia and Iraq cases it 
is difficult to gauge the extent or even existence of this alleged “ideological divide.”67 Even 
when comparing public opinions in favor of intervention, it needs to be considered that the 
Bosnian War was fought because of humanitarian reasons. CNN pictures about the atrocities 
of ethnic cleansing on Europe‟s doorstep are bound to, and in many cases did, generate more 
public support than an invasion aimed at preventing another terrorist attack that did not 
directly affect Europeans. 
                                                     
62
 Long, p. 30 
63
 Garton Ash, “The New Anti-Europeanism in America” in Lindenberg (ed.), Beyond Paradise and Power: 
Europe, America, and the Future of a Troubled Partnership (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 129 
64
 Erlanger, “Anatomy of a Breakdown” in Lindenberg, p. 18 
65
Sharp, p. 89 
66
 Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to Transatlantic 
Drift (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 255 
67
 Cohen-Tanugi, Alliance At Risk (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. xi 
Transatlantic Tensions 
- 23 - 
 
Nevertheless, this gives credit to Kagan‟s thesis that historical experiences do in fact have 
some influence on differing ideological developments across the Atlantic, which in turn leads 
to different perceptions on how to deal with threats. In the Iraq crisis, Europe and America 
differ over how to deal with Islamist terrorists. For the US who experienced 9/11 as an 
unprecedented attack on its soil and lost thousands of lives that day, terrorism is an act of war 
and needs to be tackled that way, that is, by using military force to fight back. First to defeat 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and then to prevent another 9/11 – or worse even, a 9/11 with 
WMD – by disabling potential threats that could cause such horror scenarios. Europeans, on 
the other hand, had not shared the same experience on 9/11. There was European outrage and 
solidarity, but in the end, it was the Americans that were attacked and the terrorist threat was 
not as imminent for the Europeans. Even after the attacks in Madrid and London, US and EU 
threat perceptions differed. Europeans, having dealt with IRA, ETA and RAF terrorists in the 
past, see terrorism as a crime and tend to think that a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, rather than war on Iraq, would be a bigger contribution to the long-term 
success of the war against terrorism.
68
  
A similar observation can be made with regard to the Bosnia crisis. According to Dana Allin, 
there was a transatlantic divide over whether the Bosnian War was a civil war or a war of 
aggression. The conflict included both, but which aspect one emphasized had great practical 
and moral significance. If regarded as a civil war, as the French and British did, there was 
little the outside world could do except provide humanitarian aid and wait until the warring 
parties had killed each other off. The Americans on the other hand, saw the conflict as a war 
of aggression, where they saw the possibility, even a duty to defend the victim and confront 
the aggressor.
69
 Clinton, himself, felt there was a moral problem in not enabling people under 
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attack to defend themselves.
70
 This led to transatlantic tensions early on in the Clinton 
administration when it rejected the Vance-Owen plan, which was developed by Cyrus Vance 
and Lord Owen, working for the UN and EU respectively, and suggested the division of 
Bosnia into ten cantons, each controlled by one of the three ethnic groups. In the US the plan 
was attacked as a sell-out to the Serb aggressors and ultimately rejected.
71
 These different 
takes on the war led to further clashes later on. A French general spoke for many in Europe 
when he blamed Washington for the continuation of war in Bosnia by encouraging the belief 
that US military support would be given to the Bosnian Muslims: “A false impression was 
given to the international community to help stir the vision of the Bosnian Serbs as the enemy, 
and unfortunately, all this very nearly went out of control.”72 
Looking at both crises, it seems that transatlantic tensions are increasingly due to differing 
worldviews that determine threat perceptions and when to use force. Whereas the Cold War 
against communism, and the atrocities in Bosnia in the end, brought America and Europe 
together, the war against terrorism in the Middle East is pulling them apart. The Soviet Union 
united the West; the Middle East divides it.
73
 It may well be that US and EU interests simply 
converged or overlapped in the Balkans in the 1990s, just enough to prevent outright 
rupture.
74
 The problem was not with policy – the killing had to be stopped – but rather with 
process and strategy.
75
 In Iraq on the other hand, transatlantic differences took a turn for the 
worse. Old Europe – and many people on the streets of New Europe as well –opposed the 
policy of pre-emption, although strategic disputes ensued as well, most notably about the 
issue of Turkey‟s protection. It has been pointed out, however, that unlike previous 
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transatlantic crises, operations were not hampered in the end: “France and Germany both 
facilitated US intervention by providing access to air space and logistical support. In that 
sense, the Iraqi crisis was marked more by diplomatic malpractice than by the earlier, more 
severe mutual sabotage.”76 The following chapter will look at the diplomatic dimensions of 
both crises in more detail to evaluate to what extent they played into the rifts. In particular, it 
will be looked at whether Charles Kupchan‟s argument that “Europe is not balancing against 
US power but against US behavior,” can be supported.77 As the Bosnia crisis has shown, the 
Europeans – with the exception of most Germans maybe – are not pacifists and not averse to 
the use of US power. A major point of debate during the Bosnia issue was not US power but 
the lack of American leadership. This suggests that there is more to transatlantic 
disagreements than the fact that the US has unprecedented power.  
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CHAPTER 3 
“No European countries can ever be counted “in” or “out” completely: domestic politics 
change, opinion polls shift, moods will turn.”78 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, it is difficult to make generalizations where Europe is 
concerned, even more so when taking factors such as domestic politics and personal 
differences among leaders into account. If no European country can therefore be counted in or  
out, as Anne Applebaum concludes, factors like US behavior and diplomacy do matter. 
Joseph Nye has warned the US for years of the dangers of  unilateralism and the „arrogance of 
power‟.79  And Stephen Walt thinks that the US “can use its power and wealth to compel 
others to do what it wants, but this strategy will surely fail in the long run. In most 
circumstances, the key is not power but persuasion.”80 The following will look at whether US 
failure to persuade its allies had an impact on transatlantic tensions in the Bosnia and Iraq 
crises. 
Over the past decade and a half the US has gained a reputation for not paying enough 
attention to the detailed concerns of its allies, which has created resentment in Europe.
81
 The 
Bosnia crisis was no exception, even though it did not start out that way. In 1993, after 
Clinton had taken office, he was, in fact, deferring to the European allies on the question of 
Bosnia.
82
 Clinton had been against the embargo from the beginning and was trying to take 
action against it after his election. He sent his secretary of state, Warren Christopher, on a trip 
to Europe to convince NATO leaders to support his policy of „lift and strike‟ in order to 
reverse the disadvantage for the Bosnian Muslims and enable them to fight back. But when 
Christopher‟s efforts ran into trouble from the moment he landed in Europe and the US 
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proposal was adamantly opposed, on the grounds that European leaders feared for their troops 
on the ground in case of increased Serbian capabilities, the Clinton administration turned its 
attention away from trying to persuade its allies of the benefits of the US policy and towards 
how the conflict could be contained and how to deal with the humanitarian problems.
83
 
Straining the alliance did not seem to have been an option for the administration. Indeed, 
Garton Ash finds evidence that it was agreed among Clinton administration officials that 
“NATO [was] more important than Bosnia.”84 Clinton later explained that preserving good 
relations with the alliance was more important. "We have bigger fish to fry with the 
Europeans," he said.
85
 While the end of the Cold War had caused Washington to focus more 
on domestic issues, it had not completely forgotten about its interests in Europe, in particular 
vis-à-vis Russia and with regards to NATO and European eastward expansion, which the 
Clinton administration supported through policy initiatives like the Partnership for Peace and 
the New Transatlantic Agenda. 
Of course, Clinton was influenced in his decision to abandon „lift and strike‟ in 1993 by other 
factors apart from European opposition, which Christopher sums up as follows: 
Enthusiasm for a bold stroke that might draw us into a Balkan quagmire had 
evaporated. The President reportedly had been reading books on Balkan history that 
presented a grim picture of prospects for reconciliation […] Memories of Vietnam 
caused many, especially those in the military, to resist commitment to a dangerous and 
uncertain mission in a confusing and complicated conflict […] To them, the costs 
seemed too high to act.
86
  
On top of that, DiPrizio observes that Clinton‟s indecisiveness and inconsistency confused the 
world, and his statements promised much that his policies could not deliver.
87
 This was 
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particularly the case during the following year, which was marked by “rift and drift”, where 
relations with NATO allies were tattered and the administration could not decide what to do.
88
  
The US stance on „lift and strike,‟ for example, caused transatlantic problems in 1994, when 
the Clinton administration chose to ignore arms shipments from Iran to the Bosnian Muslims, 
at a time when the US was meant to be helping to enforce an arms embargo.
89
 The 
administration had deferred to the Europeans and decided not to „lift and strike‟ and yet it was 
acting behind its allies‟ backs. Unsurprisingly, when these allegations became public in early 
1995, they caused a major uproar at NATO headquarters in Brussels. NATO officials denied 
any knowledge of weapons deliveries, but UN personnel said there was no doubt that the 
operation was induced and coordinated by the United States.
90
   
Things had already taken a turn for the worse in November 1994, when the Clinton 
administration had officially announced that the US would no longer enforce the arms 
embargo against Bosnia. Public feuding resulted, with the American side complaining that the 
Europeans had caused a “complete breakdown” of NATO by repeatedly vetoing air strikes on 
the Serbs, and Europeans condemning US criticism considering that there were no American 
troops in harms way that would have to face the consequences of Serbian rearmament.
91
 The 
Clinton administration had acted in response to pressure from Congress which threatened to 
cut all funds for enforcing the ban. The emerging consensus among Republicans in Congress 
was, according to Senator Richard Lugar, that Europeans cared less about a solution to the 
conflict than Americans. European concerns about their troops in Bosnia were dismissed by 
Lugar with the words that the British, French and other NATO allies were only on the ground 
as Samaritans, “to feed the people, not to fight. Instead of creating justice, UN troops are 
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constantly in danger of being taken hostage. They are only in the way. That annoys 
Americans.”92 
But the unilateral lift of the embargo did not help with gaining European support for the US 
approach. On the contrary, they were accused of undermining the alliance and instead turning 
themselves into an ally of the Muslims.
93
 British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, said “It is 
a worry because this is a mandatory resolution of the Security Council and an agreed policy of 
the alliance.”94 And NATO Secretary General Willy Claes warned the US not to depart from 
the common approach.
95
 The US did not have to go that far because when the US finally 
decided to “put some real muscle behind [its] rhetoric,” it gained strong expressions of 
support from its European allies.
96
 Other factors – most notably the fall of Srebrenica and the 
slaughter of an estimated 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys, which increased public 
pressure to do something on both sides of the Atlantic – played into the US decision to push 
for sustained strategic and tactical airstrikes combined with a ground offensive by local forces 
from summer 1995 onwards to find a solution to the Bosnian conflict and restore NATO‟s 
credibility. 
So, while the Clinton administration did act unilaterally during the Bosnia crisis in relation to 
„lift and strike,‟ it eventually exerted leadership in a way that brought the allies on board with 
their initiative to stop the war by, for example, sending National Security Advisor Tony Lake 
and State Department official Peter Tarnoff to Europe to rally support.
97
 It should be noted in 
this context, that while the Europeans were aware of their own incapability of dealing with the 
problem and repeatedly asked for the US to take the initiative, when the US finally took a 
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tougher approach, they protested sharply. Unilateralism causes transatlantic tensions because 
it seems that, at the very least, Europeans want to be listened to. 
Since George W. Bush took office, European suspicion of American behavior has increased 
enormously and more and more European politicians and academics draw attention to the 
problem. Tony Blair, for instance, warned the Bush administration that “people listen to the 
US on issues and may well agree with them, but they want the US to listen back.”98 A French 
academic argues that “the trouble arises when we feel we‟re not only not being listened to, but 
when the Americans make no pretence of even wanting to hear what we have to say.”99 And a 
former German Ambassador to the US, Wolfgang Ischinger, asks “Why is it that in 
Washington European criticism is being treated as insignificant comments?” It would be 
good, he thinks, “if the US was not acting as if Europe was inconsequential”100  
The US handling of this problem does not much to alleviate these suspicions, however. At the 
height of the transatlantic crisis over the Iraq invasion, US officials made sure to reinforce 
European worries that administration officials were not interested in European involvement in 
the decision-making process. As Richard Perle put it at the Munich Conference on Security 
Policy in February 2003: “I promise you one thing: If we had to choose between efficient 
protection against terrorism and a long list of friends, we would choose efficient 
protection.”101 The US openly shows where its priorities are – and its allies are not it. 
During his election campaign in 2000, George Bush said: “If we are an arrogant nation, 
they‟ll resent us. If we‟re a humble nation, but strong, they‟ll welcome us.”102 Back then, he 
got to the root of a major problem he has been faced with in office. Considering Bush‟s words 
it is surprising to hear administration officials conclude that they simply didn‟t understand 
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how American power could be seen as more dangerous than Saddam Hussein.
103
 The problem 
is that the US wields its power in a way that is resented increasingly not just by rogue nations 
but by allies as well. And Bush‟s diplomatic style seems to represent the American „arrogance 
of power‟ more than anything else. 
Bush‟s style has been described as marked by a lack of diplomatic finesse and “an 
overweening arrogance that is a product of a combination of righteousness, pride and 
passion.”104 Bush himself says: “I kind of picture myself as a pretty good diplomat, but 
nobody else does. You know, particularly, I wouldn‟t call me a diplomat.”105 Indeed, it has 
been reported that he has been impatient with the formalities that traditionally mark 
presidents‟ relationships with their peers. Stiff photo opportunities bore him. On overseas 
trips, he asks aides to spare him the chitchat with other leaders that he disparages as “small 
talk in big rooms.”106 While Vice President Cheney finds Bush‟s direct style refreshing, others 
complain about his lack of subtlety.
107
 His „you are either with us or with the terrorists‟ 
rhetoric is causing mistrust in Europe. Unlike Clinton, he comes across as absolutist and not 
able to take the lead and pull people along no matter how reluctant they are.
108
 On the 
contrary, Bush gives the impression that it does not matter whether the rest of the world or at 
least his allies are with him and this openly arrogant attitude has caused Europeans to start 
viewing the US with distrust more and more.  
Hence, it is hardly a surprise that Jacques Chirac summed up the French attitude in 2003 as 
follows: “This is not about Iraq,” he said at the height of the battle over UN Security Council 
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resolutions. “This is about the United States.”109 And Javier Solana explained in 2002 that 
Europeans are “instinctive multilateralists” that want the US to be more committed to 
multilateral solutions.
110
 
This European suspicion of US unilateralism and the increasing role it plays in creating 
transatlantic disagreements is, again, due to geopolitical changes since the end of the Cold 
War and the „psychology of weakness‟. Multilateralism pays off for the Venusians. If 
everyone abides by international rules, they can only gain, despite their military weakness. 
This argument, made by Kagan, explains why Europeans strongly advocate multilateralism 
and resent American tendencies to „go it alone.‟ If the US circumvents the UN completely, the 
French or British – with their seat on the Security Council – will not have the opportunity to 
have a say on the international stage and thus influence decisions in such a way that will 
benefit their interests. In the end, unilateralism comes at a cost for Europe because irrelevant 
international institutions mean a loss of power for the Europeans. To avoid that, Kagan 
argues, Europeans are hoping to constrain American power without wielding power 
themselves; in what may be the ultimate feat of subtlety and indirection, they want to control 
the behemoth by appealing to its conscience.
111
 
For the Americans, on the other hand, “multilateral agreements and institutions should not be 
ends in themselves.”112 It has been argued that this is a common streak in US foreign policy 
rather than a recent departure by Clinton and Bush.
113
 Both crises also support the case that 
Europeans placed great importance on multilateral channels. In Bosnia, the British were 
adamant that any decision should pass through the UN Security Council, and France also 
avoided any unilateral action.
114
 With regard to Iraq their positions were the same, with Tony 
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Blair insisting that the US went to the UN to legitimize an intervention and France 
announcing that “no military action could be conducted without the decision of the Security 
Council.”115 Yet, France undermined the alleged “instinctive” European multilateralism over 
Iraq, when Chirac threatened to veto a UN resolution on Iraq in any case. France, in this 
instance, placed tying down the Americans above the principle of multilateralism, which 
turned out to be counterproductive in terms of preserving the authority and role of the 
Security Council.
116
 
In this context it should be noted that some scholars have pointed out that “the EU's 
instinctive multilateralism is a legitimising myth for European countries that have always 
been, and remain, selective in their support for multilateral cooperation both among 
themselves and with third countries.”117 Indeed, as Richard Perle pointed out in a 2003 
interview:  
The [German] government and the Chancellor in particular have taken on a very, very 
extreme position. The Chancellor said no, Germany won‟t participate in any way, even 
if the United Nations want to sanction the use of force. I think that is a certain form of 
unilateralism, of which we are often accused of, but a very extreme one.
118
 
In 1991, it was also the Germans that unilaterally recognized Croatia and Slovenia. In its 
relations with the United Nations, Europeans also seem to be rather selective. The UN was 
eased out of a front-line role in the Balkans. Especially after its humiliation in Bosnia, where 
UN-designated „safe havens‟ were overrun with severe humanitarian consequences, and so 
the UN was thoroughly marginalized by the time of Kosovo.
119
 
Furthermore, it was Jacques Chirac who reacted with such arrogance to the prospective new 
members of the EU who dared to speak up at the adults' table and express their own sovereign 
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views.
120
 They called them not very well behaved and told them that they “missed a great 
opportunity to keep quiet.”121 Arrogance and unilateralism are not exclusively reserved for the 
Americans, it seems. Combined with tactless diplomacy on both sides, this made the 
transatlantic crisis over Iraq particularly severe. 
In Germany, Chancellor Schröder faced a tough reelection in the fall of 2002 and privately 
welcomed Cheney‟s speech, declaring that the threat of weapons of mass destruction in 
Saddam‟s hands would justify an attack, as “the miracle” with which he would launch his 
campaign “to woo back his disaffected left-wing and pacifist supporters.”122And so the 
unlimited solidarity that Schröder had talked about after the September 11 attacks, turned into 
an unconditional no.
123
 He flat out rejected any military involvement and he did it openly, not 
in consultation with the Americans. His own party criticized him for his diplomatic manners, 
saying that it was a “matter of style,” that Schröder should not speak his mind about US 
policy publicly, but in direct talks with Washington.
124
 On top of that, the German justice 
minister compared President Bush to Hitler in that he was using military action abroad to 
divert from domestic problems. The American reaction was understandably described as 
“outrageous and inexplicable,” and the incident led – in Condolezza Rice‟s words – to “a 
poisoned atmosphere.”125 
In Paris, French diplomacy also did little to prevent transatlantic relations from deteriorating, 
if anything, Gordon and Shapiro observe, it seemed designed to undermine what little trust 
and confidence did exist.
126
 The comments coming out of Paris were asking how Blair and 
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Bush could justify going to war with Iraq (considering that France had had a long and shady 
relationship with Saddam, which in turn also influenced the French decision to oppose the 
war, was not well received by the Americans).
127
 Paris was complaining about not wanting to 
live in a multipolar world and be subject to US unilateral action.
128
 But then it said it would 
veto another Security Council resolution no matter what, and later, together with Germany 
and Belgium, vetoed a US request for NATO to make plans to protect Turkey if Saddam 
Hussein attacks.
129
 
The Americans were not much better, though. Certainly Donald Rumsfeld‟s input did not help 
the whole situation. First he dismissed France and Germany as Old Europe that had lost its 
relevance.
130
 Then he compared Germany, an old ally, to two of America‟s biggest 
adversaries: Cuba and Libya. Subsequent US praise for New Europe, and the Polish in 
particular, just further irritated the French and Germans.
131
 In addition to that, American 
efforts to communicate their objectives for the war in Iraq were spread rather thinly, as Anne 
Applebaum notes:  
Although military planning for the war in Iraq began in the summer of 2002, there was 
no attempt to explain or promote the war in Europe until much later. Even after the 
war, President Bush rarely bothered to address himself to anyone other than his 
domestic constituents, although the entire world could see him and hear him every 
time he made a speech.
132
 
Moreover, the link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11 that US officials gave as reason for 
their invention plans was never accepted outside the US. Thus US talk about pre-emptive 
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attack in self-defense, did not find much support in Old Europe, despite the fact that 
Europeans acknowledged a legitimate US motive for self-defense after 9/11.
133
 
American diplomacy also failed to counter a Franco-German alliance on the Turkey issue and 
the Iraq debate in the UN. While Schröder had already made his stance clear in 2002, the 
French government was still “uneasily sitting on the fence at the time.”134 Schröder and 
Chirac, who had previously found little common political and personal ground, had a reason 
to work closely together. They both might have seen an opportunity in this new situation to 
influence the future of Europe. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the EU is an important factor in 
French and German politics and in the wake of EU expansion and increasing influence of 
formerly peripheral members like Britain and Spain, Chirac and Schröder probably saw an 
agreement on Iraq as an opportunity to re-establish their leadership of the EU. Their combined 
stance on Iraq gave them the chance to isolate the more Atlanticist Blair, Aznar and 
Berlusconi in relation to their antiwar publics. It was a chance for them to maybe not speak 
for „Europe‟ but to speak for „Europeans‟, and to make the British, Spanish and Italian leaders 
pay a price for falling into line behind the United States.
135
 The United States and Britain, on 
the other hand, failed to convince enough friends and allies that this war was necessary, 
urgent, or even legal, an outcome – as Steven Erlanger points out – that the Bush 
administration preferred to blame on anyone other than itself.
136
  
It also should not be overlooked that Schröder and Chirac genuinely seemed to be against a 
war in Iraq. Schröder had voiced his opinion long before his election campaign. Nonetheless, 
both leaders seemed to have valued their interests more than the Atlantic Alliance and in this 
sense sacrificed multilateralism to the same extent that the Americans did. Therefore, some 
observers have said that personal antagonism should be considered as a factor for the 
                                                     
133
 Merkl, p. 50 
134
 Ibid., p. 6 
135
 Gordon and Shapiro, p. 125-128 
136
 Erlanger, p. 12 
Transatlantic Tensions 
- 37 - 
 
transatlantic rifts over Iraq: “Don‟t underestimate the impact of the personalities of Bush and 
Schröder. Neither one wanted to take the first step and admit that they had made a mistake,” 
as one advisor in the Chancellor‟s office put it.137 With Bush and Chirac the situation seemed 
to be the same, although one might agree that Margaret Thatcher had a point when she said 
that “the problem with the French, is that they are French.”138 After all, it is always the French 
that are involved in transatlantic disputes, over Suez, their withdrawal from integrated NATO 
command, Bosnia and Iraq. It is likely that the personalities of de Gaulle and Chirac had a 
role to play in these developments, but even in spite of the fact that there was an “honorary 
European” living in the White House during the 1990s, Europeans were not happy with US 
behavior during the Bosnia episode. Diplomatic failures, could have been avoided like the 
reality that Americans insisted, over French objections, that the peace talks be held at Dayton, 
Ohio and then proceeded to keep the Europeans out of the loop on the negotiations.
139
  
The biggest transatlantic problem, however, resulted from unilateral US action, which 
suggests that Europeans who are blaming transatlantic disputes on George W. Bush and his 
policies have forgotten that the Clinton administration in the end, did not shy away from 
doing what they thought they had to do in Bosnia, with or without their allies, in line with a 
slogan that Sandy Berger coined: “multilateral when you can, unilateral when you must.”140 
Overall, however, cooler heads seemed to have prevailed in the crisis over Bosnia and the 
diplomatic fallout was not as severe as it was over Iraq. Why? John Peterson thinks that  
At least part of the answer may be that both sides remained committed […] to joint 
action as a policy goal per se and, more broadly, to the „logic of arguing‟. This logic 
governs negotiations in which actors seek, above all, a „reasoned consensus‟ on 
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common goals, as opposed to a strict and complete fulfillment of their own fixed 
preferences.
141
 
In the end, the Americans took charge grumbling about European ineffectiveness, but they 
realized that they had to reverse their policy of indecision, return to their leadership position 
and bring their allies along in order to preserve alliance unity and NATO credibility. The case 
was different in the Iraq dispute, however. It became so ugly because the less visible 
developments that have been pulling Europe and America in different directions since the end 
of the Cold War were worsened by irresponsibility on both sides of the Atlantic that 
manifested themselves in serious diplomatic gaffes. And so alliance unity turned into 
„coalitions of the willing‟ because US priority was not to please its allies, but to protect the 
country from what they saw as a vital threat to its security. And since they had the means to 
do it, they did. In a sense that closes the circle and shows that all factors contribute at least to 
an extent, since transatlantic disputes result from a complex interaction of many factors. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Due to the complexity of both crises it is difficult to determine which factor is most 
explanatory for transatlantic disputes. In the Bosnia case the tensions arose because Europe 
was not able to effectively deal with the problem and the US, for a long time, was reluctant to 
enter a conflict that was not directly affecting its national interests. As a result, the shifting of 
blame became a common occurrence and source of friction as long as the war raged on. The 
strongest complains from the European side, however, were made as a reaction to unilateral 
actions of the US. This was also a key reason for the clash over the Iraq intervention, although 
negligent diplomacy, domestic politics and personal differences lead to an escalation of the 
situation. This seems to imply that the „arrogance‟ of power constitutes a real danger for 
transatlantic unity.  
On a positive note, however, this arrogance appears to be a condition that can be changed 
through more conciliatory diplomatic measures as well as staff changes on both sides of the 
Atlantic, as has already occurred in Paris and Berlin and did indeed improve relations. 
Considering that Clinton acted unilaterally as well and that Europeans are not free from 
unilateral tendencies themselves, the differing positions on multilateralism also do not seem to 
be creating the insurmountable obstacle to transatlantic tranquility. As the NATO campaign in 
Kosovo has shown, allied unity can exist without UN authorization as long as there is a 
common enemy and a common strategy. 
These common goals, of course, are a more problematic subject because of the underlying 
trends that are causing Europe and America to drift apart in this regard. The end of the Cold 
War and 9/11 in particular have laid open that Europeans in many respects take a different 
approach to the international challenges that have emerged post-Cold War and post-9/11. To 
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what extent these different reactions can be traced back to historical backgrounds and 
ideological divergences due to different power capabilities is difficult to isolate by simply 
looking at two instances of US-European disagreements. Even more so because generalizing 
about Europe is problematic in most regards. After all, the comparison of these two cases has 
shown that not all Europeans are averse to the use of force to the same extent and for the same 
reasons; the same might be said for the Americans. The power gap by itself is therefore a 
rather questionable reason for transatlantic tensions. What it shows, however, is that Europe 
needs America. In Bosnia, it became very clear very quickly and as the efforts of Chirac‟s and 
Schröder‟s successors to get back into Washington‟s good books indicate, no European leader 
can afford to alienate the US in the long run. Yet, the aftermath of Iraq has also shown that in 
regard to the US, soft power does matter, particularly when engaged in an endeavor as 
ambitious as the War on Terror.  
Consequently, caricatures of peacenik Europeans and cowboy Americans are leading attention 
away from the fact that Europe and America share many common goals and purposes that are 
bound to keep them working together. In the end, Europe and America came to a common 
ground on Bosnia, and today they are fighting terrorists and not each other. We might have to 
get used to more frequent disagreements because of the changing nature of the international 
system as well as changing domestic circumstances on both sides of the Atlantic, but the 
demise of the West does not seem imminent.  
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